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ENTREPRENEURS’ ACCESS TO PRIVATE EQUITY IN CHINA: 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
Abstract: Drawing on Social network theory, this article argues for enhancing effects of 
social capital of entrepreneurs on investment selection decisions of venture capitalists (to 
invest versus not to invest), and main effects of social capital on investment process 
decisions such as venture valuation, investment delivery speed and contractual 
warrants/provisions. The core idea of enhancing effects is that the presence of particularistic 
ties between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs will affect positively investment selection 
decisions of venture capitalists if only other main factors for investment making such as 
management team, industry, market attractiveness, proprietary technologies and products are 
perceived as strong by investors. The context of the study is People’s Republic of China. 
The empirical data is composed of 158 venture capital investment decisions in Beijing and 
Shanghai. The main finding is that social capital is supplementary and additive to other 
investment determining factors such as project and team qualities at selection stage, and 
social capital is a main factor for investment process decisions once a venture has been 
selected for funding. The main theoretical implication is that social capital may affect 
outcome variables in interaction with other factors. The main practical implication for 
entrepreneurs is that social capital is probably necessary but insufficient for raising venture 
capital successfully. 
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This article explores the way in which entrepreneurs do access private equity capital 
and examines the role of personal social capital in obtaining venture finance. Drawing on 
Social network theory (Bourdieu, 1996, Burt, 1992, Coleman, 1988, Granovetter, 1985, Lin, 
2001a) we argue for enhancing effects of social capital of entrepreneurs on access to private 
equity at venture screening stage. The core idea of enhancing effects of social capital is that 
the presence of particularistic direct (e.g., prior professional relationship, or interpersonal 
friendship) and indirect (e.g., third party referral) ties between entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists will affect positively investment selection decisions of venture capitalists if only 
other main factors for investment making such as management team, industry and market 
attractiveness, anticipated growth rate and proprietary technologies and products (Bygrave 
& Timmons, 1992, Timmons, 1994) are perceived as strong by investors. Social capital of 
entrepreneurs enhances and flavors venture finance decisions in  combination  with and 
supplement to main investment determining factors because of the interactive character of 
investors’ rationality and socialized nature of economic exchanges. In addition, we argue for 
main effects of strong ties between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists on processes of 
investment decision making such as firm valuation, investment delivery speed and 
contractual warrants once a venture has been selected for funding. Tie strength is likely to 
influence investment processes because of information, perceptual, trust and risk reduction 
benefits inherent in strong relations. Overall, we found significant enhancing effects of 
social capital on investment selection (to invest versus not to invest) and significant main 
effects of social capital on investment processes. 
We see three contributions of this article to the management research literature. First, 
this article is first to argue for enhancing or supplementary effects of social capital on 
outcome variables. The finding that social capital in interactions with other factors William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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influences investment selection is a contribution to the social network theory the principal 
postulate of which is main effects on dependent variables. Second, we demonstrate that 
social relationships embedded in local cultures and traditions do affect entrepreneurial 
process and venture investment decisions in unique ways. The way in which entrepreneurs 
raise capital and investors select ventures to fund is contingent upon local cultural and social 
contexts (Burt, 1997). Third, to our knowledge, this study is first article that examines 
impacts of social capital on venture investment decisions in the transition economy context 
and the Mainland China context. Therefore, we see a contribution to the management 
research literature on transition economies as well as the Chinese context.  
The country context of the study is the largest and fastest growing transition 
economy – People’s Republic of China (PRC). The rationale behind the choice of the 
research site and context is threefold: First, testing and probing of Social network theory that 
was initially developed in the Western economic and social environments, in an Asian and 
transition context provides a unique opportunity to expand, enrich and modify this theory. 
Second, examining entrepreneurship and decision making in venture capital in the Chinese 
context sheds lights on how indigenous cultures and institutions shape and influence 
entrepreneurial processes and investment decisions. This will enable us to understand better 
contingent features of entrepreneurship and financial decision-making in different contexts. 
Third, China is a potential economic superpower in 21
st century and therefore, it is important 
practically to study the new entrepreneurial sector that comprises a lion’s share of new 
wealth creation and job generation in the world’s most populous country. 
Transactions between economic agents are quintessentially social in its core feature. 
Economic actors, i.e., individuals, groups and organizations, are embedded and nurtured in 
webs of social relationships (Granovetter, 1985), and as social capitalists, they capitalize on William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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resources and assets located in social networks for instrumental actions (Lin, 2001b). The 
postulate that individual and inter-organizational relationships either facilitate or constrain 
agents’ instrumental actions is widely accepted (Granovetter, 1985). Social capital of actors 
defined as networks of relationships and resources inherent in these networks (Bourdieu, 
1986, Burt, 1997, Coleman, 1988, Lin, 2001a), has positive impacts on firm performance 
(Baker, 1990) product innovation (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) and industry-wide network 
formation (Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997). Researchers found that social capital of 
individuals facilitates job and status attainment (Granovetter, 1973, Lin, Vaughn & Ensel, 
1981, Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988), enhances individuals’ power (Krackhardt, 1990) and 
career mobility (Podolny & Baron, 1997) and impacts CEO compensation (Belliveau, 
O’Reilly III & Wade, 1996).  
Research on personal networks of entrepreneurs revealed that entrepreneurs perceive 
and exploit business opportunities in disconnected networks – “structural holes” (Burt, 
1992), obtain information, advice and social support from network alters (Aldrich & 
Zimmer, 1986, Birley, 1985, Nohria, 1992), control and manage exchange structures 
through network dyads (Larson, 1992), access financial capital through contacts (Shane & 
Cable, 2001, Uzzi, 1999), and get an endorsement from prestigious players to influence 
perceptions of the quality of their ventures (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). In the context of 
transition economies, researchers found that social capital of managers and entrepreneurs 
affects firm performance indicators such as revenue and profitability (Batjargal, 2000, Peng 
& Luo, 2000).  
  With the exception of Shane & Cable (2001), there is no empirical research up to 
date that examines entrepreneurs’ access to venture capital through personal social 
networks. However, there is a large research literature on interactions of entrepreneurs and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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venture capitalists in the post-investment context. Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996) examined 
entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationships from the perspective of procedural justice and 
found that venture capitalists had greater trust in and commitment to entrepreneurs who 
provided them with more timely. Cable & Shane (1997) argued that both entrepreneurs and 
equity capital providers have strong incentives to cooperate in post-investment relationships 
due to the prisoner’s dilemma they face. Researchers also examined staging of venture 
capital investments (Sahlman, 1990), post-investment monitoring and oversight (Gompers, 
1995, Lerner, 1995), contractual terms and negotiations (Hellmann, 1998, Landstrom et al, 
1998), interactions between product market and venture capital financing (Hellmann & Puri, 
2000) and geographic and industry localization of venture capital investments (Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001). A descriptive study has found that industry, firm goals and experience of the 
founder have emerged as differentiating factors in raising successfully private equity among 
women-entrepreneurs (Brush et al., 2000). 
  The only research that exclusively focuses on pre-investment relationships of 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists is Shane & Cable (2001). Based on qualitative 
interviews and survey of seed stage investors, they demonstrate main effects of direct and 
indirect ties between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists on venture finance decisions. 
Direct and indirect ties influence the selection of ventures to fund through a process of 
information transfer. 
  In contrast to previous research, we would like to argue that social capital has 
different impacts on investment decisions at varying stages of investment making in the pre-
investment context. In venture screening and selection stage, particularistic ties between 
venture fund seekers and providers are supplementary and additive to universalistic criteria 
such as quality and experience of entrepreneurial team, technical indicators of products and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
 
  5
technology, and potential to grow as fast as “gazelles”, which venture capitalists consider 
first as rational investors. If venture capitalist assesses and perceives a new firm as a 
“potential gazelle” using the universalistic criteria mentioned above, then and only then 
social capital might be at work: ties are used as information gathering and verification 
channels as well as control means and devices to mitigate perceived risks and uncertainties 
on both sides, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. In interaction with other factors, social 
capital enhances investment selection likelihood at the stage of screening. Once that decision 
has been made in favor of the entrepreneur, relational strength of entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists is likely to influence the processes of investment negotiations and terms, i.e., 
valuations, delivery speed and warrants and provisions. Therefore, our overall argument is 
that social capital is a supplement to universalistic criteria in investment selections but a 
major factor that affects processes of actual investment making. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The basic principle of investment theory is that investors as rational actors do invest 
when the present value of the future expected return is greater than the investment because 
of time-value of money (Brealey & Myers, 1996). Investors are likely to invest in only those 
projects, which are expected and perceived to produce an acceptable net present value 
defined as the present value minus required investment. Investors screen potential projects 
using industry-wide, universal criteria to identify and discriminate best possible 
opportunities. In the venture capital context, the quality of management team, 
industry/market and technology attractiveness, upside potential and downside exposure, 
stage of development, amount of capital required, founders’ goals, control, liquidity and 
harvest are accepted as the main investment determining factors (Bygrave et al., 1998, Hall 
& Hofer, 1993, Macmillan, Siegel, & Subbanarasimha, 1985, Macmillan, Zeman & William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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Subbanarasimha, 1987). The underpinning logic of investors’ rationality suggests that 
venture capitalists will base their decisions on universalistic criteria rather than 
particularistic criteria due to the widely-agreed upon, well defined standards for screening 
and evaluation of funding proposals (Pfeffer et al, 1976).  It is assumed therefore that 
venture capitalists base their decisions on technical merits of each project irrelevant of its 
social and cultural context. 
Investing in new and small firms, however, is regarded as an extremely high risk 
action because firms have no performance track record and comparable investment to 
ascertain the expected rates of return (Brealey & Myers, 1996) and there is a considerable 
liability of newness and smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Also the information asymmetry 
problem between investors and entrepreneurs exacerbates the risk and uncertainties inherent 
in new firm creation and development (Shane & Cable, 2001). Risk and uncertainty are used 
interchangeably in the present study, and it is defined as “a lack of consensus about purposes 
and the means of achieving them” (Pfeffer et al., 1976: 230). In the new firm context, 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs face varieties of risks: they are uncertain about 
technological and product outcomes of a project, they lack a consensus on industry and 
market downside exposure, and they are often unsure about abilities of the management 
team and the investor (Timmons, 1994). In addition, there is a considerable social risk – 
uncertainties regarding each other’s intentions, trustworthiness, personalities and behavioral 
patterns in the post-investment period (Macmillan, Siegel, & Subbanarasimha, 1985). A 
descriptive study by Kaplan & Stromberg (2000) found that 60 percent of venture capitalists 
were concerned about social uncertainties such as the founder’s motives or personalities. 
Mitigation of social risk is even more important in this context because both investors and 
receivers are “locked up” in illiquid investments for at least 5-6 years (Cable & Shane, 1997, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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Gompers & Lerner, 1999). Previous research suggests that venture capitalists mitigate 
different types of risks by employing varieties of strategies, methods and techniques. They 
focus on certain technology and product areas where they have specialized knowledge and 
experience, or they co-invest with others who have intimate knowledge about the technology 
and products (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Venture capitalists do syndicate their investments 
in certain geographic areas because of information flows and proximity benefits (Sorenson 
& Stuart, 2001). Likewise, equity providers prefer to invest in growing industries and 
promising or overlooked niches of markets where there are less competitions (Timmons, 
1994). Venture capitalists assess human capital and abilities of teams by verifying 
managerial and industry experience, technical skills, reputation, integrity, and marketing 
skills (Hisrich & Jancowicz, 1990, Smart, 1998). 
 The research literature is not concerned with how investors do mitigate social risks, 
and to what extend investors view social uncertainties as important risks to be dealt with. 
Despite the underlying assumption of investors’ rationality, there is an empirical evidence 
that investors still try to reduce social risks in venture funding decisions although it is not 
main criteria for a decision (Macmillan, Siegel, & Subbanarasimha, 1985, Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2000).  
Decision making theory in high uncertainty situations postulates that the greater the 
uncertainty the more likely that economic agents will choose particular exchange partners 
with whom they have had prior transactions (Podolny, 1994). This happens because actors 
tend to search exchange partners among those about whom they have better knowledge and 
be satisfied by the results (March, 1988), and actors tend to compare themselves with 
socially similar others and employ particularistic criteria such as social relationships to make 
the decision and resolve the uncertainty (Pfeffer, et al., 1976). Actors are assumed to have William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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better knowledge about those players with whom they have enduring relationships 
(Granovetter, 1973) and therefore, decision makers are likely to favor those actors with 
whom they have particularistic ties given other decision criteria are satisfied. In socially 
uncertain situations, actors are likely to enter in exchange relations with those of similar 
positional status (Podolny & Castellucci, 1999) and those who possess similar demographic 
characteristics (Tsui, Egan, & O’Reilly, 1992) because relational trust in and history with 
contacts makes actors to feel that they reduce uncertainties surrounding their purposes and 
outcomes (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). Uncertainty will generally be higher in 
newer markets, e.g., venture capital, than in more established ones, since there will typically 
be less knowledge of quality distinctions and overall supply and demand in the former 
(Podolny, 1994). Considering the multiplicity of risks, venture capitalists are likely to base 
their decisions on interactive trade-offs of technology, products, market potential and social 
familiarity (Muzyka, Birley & Leleux, 1996). It is therefore assumed that venture capitalists 
are likely to invest in ventures of those entrepreneurs with whom they have had prior direct 
and indirect relationships given the main investment criteria are met. A social certainty will 
play a complementary role in selection decisions due to social comparison processes that are 
used to neutralize risks inherent. Thus, social capital of entrepreneurs enhances and 
facilitates likelihood of raising private equity. 
THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY IN CHINA 
Ever since economic reforms were launched in late 1970s the entrepreneurial spirit is in 
the rise in China despite occasional setbacks due to macro-economic and policy 
uncertainties. There were about 6 million state and collective enterprises (28 percent - state 
owned enterprises, and 72 percent - township and collective companies/corporations), 1.5 
million private companies and 31.6 million private partnerships at the end of 1999. The William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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number of private companies had increased 15 folds from 1991 to 1999 (State Industrial and 
Commercial Registration Bureau, 2000). The venture capital industry in China has 
experienced the same development patterns. Although first domestic venture capital firm 
was set up back in 1986, VC industry has intensively developed only after March 1998 
when the Chinese government adopted a number of policy schemes to promote private 
equity investments. According to a recent research, there were 180 venture capital firms 
functioning in China in July 2001 (Table 1). Total funds under management reached $US 
1.87 billion. There were 120 dedicated domestic VC firms owned by the central 
government, provincial and municipal governments, and private companies, and there were 
60 foreign VC firms (Liu & Wang, 2001). 
Despite its “infant” age and the global economic turmoil, the Chinese VC industry is 
still relatively active. There are certain features that characterize the VC industry in China. 
Government investments in VC funds are declining dramatically: in 1986 all the funds were 
government-backed whereas by July 2001 only 50 percent of money in funds were 
originated from government sources (Liu et al., 2002). This indicates that more and more 
private sector firms are setting up VC funds. Especially, publicly listed firms are expected to 
play a major role in VC investments. While foreign owned VC firms are affected by stock 
market fluctuations in the West, domestic firms are more constrained by the delayed 
opening of secondary board market. The dominance of the China’s financial system by a 
few state-owned, inefficient and unreliable banks seems to facilitate resource flows into VC 
funds. Although the Chinese VC industry has taken off the ground rather well, there are 
some serious institutional, regulatory and human capital issues to be dealt with. Limited exit 
routes for VC backed firms, deficient legal and regulatory framework, lack of trained fund 
managers, and closed clique-type networks seem to hinder development of VC industry William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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(Cheng, 2000, Zhang, 2000). For example, about 40 percent of fund managers in domestic 
VC firms were government officials and only 4 percent had prior fund management 
experience (Liu and Wang, 2001). Most VC firms in China prefer to invest in later stages of 
venture development (Cheng 2000, Zhang 2000, Zhang 2001). Due to the vague legal 
definition of partnerships in the Chinese law, domestic VC firms are registered as companies 
and corporations. This puts restrictions on how much capital can be invested in new 
entrepreneurial firms. Also many VC firms are active investors in stock markets. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT: GUANXI 
The idea of social capital in the Chinese context is captured by the indigenous social 
phenomenon called guanxi. Although there is a mild debate about exact definitions of 
guanxi (Bian, 2001, Lin, 2001c, Tsui, Farh & Xin, 2000, Walder, 1986, Yang, 1994, Yeung, 
& Tung, 1996), there is an agreement among researchers on it’s core meaning: guanxi is 
interpersonal relationships that facilitate social exchanges. The research literature on guanxi 
suggests four overlapping yet slightly different interpretations of the phenomenon.  
An ethnographic research defines guanxi as the web of extended family relationships 
(Bian, 2001, King, 1985). The family serves as the core base for guanxi, and relationships 
are strongly sentimental and expressive. There is a strong hierarchy within the family 
pyramid where the oldest male is the head of the clique. The way guanxi functions is one of 
a closed clique: there is a cohesive set of actors (family members) whose roles, obligations 
and expectations are clearly defined and re-enforced. There are also established rules, 
sanctions, traditions and symbolic rituals that sustain relationships. 
 Another  popular  interpretation of guanxi is the perspective of utilitarian ties: guanxi 
is a cluster of exchange relationships for instrumental purposes (Bian, 2001, Walder, 1986, 
Yang, 1994). The core feature of guanxi, in this sense, is the instrumental value of getting William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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things done through relationships. Walder (1986) examined personal relationships of state 
officials versus enterprise directors, party officials versus party activists, and shop-floor 
supervisors versus ordinary workers through this prism. Although major characteristics of 
guanxi such as relational strength or content remain valid in this definition, the emphasis is 
on material reciprocity as the dominant rule of the game. Instrumental gift giving and 
receiving, or social eating (Bian, 2001, Yang, 1994) are examples of utilitarian reciprocity in 
guanxi relationships. 
  Lin (2001c) suggested a “sentimental” interpretation of guanxi the underlying idea of 
which is that in contrast to economic exchanges, social exchanges are always asymmetric 
because actors focus on long-term commitment to maintaining relationships rather than 
short-term utility maximization. Actors go into relationships for the sake of the relationship. 
“It is, Lin (2001c: 22) writes, the relationship that is valued and must be maintained, not the 
value of the favor transacted per se.” The sentimental-emotional aspect or renqing of guanxi 
is emphasized here. 
  Referring to the Confucian cultural legacy of China, Tsui, Farh, & Xin (2000: 226) 
defined guanxi as a special relationship due to the existence of particularistic ties. Yeung & 
Tung (1996) proposed a similar interpretation of guanxi as a cultural subsystem embedded 
in Confucian values as opposed to social relationships based on Western values. Guanxi as a 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon is interpreted through bases for guanxi (e.g., family 
ties versus acquaintances), modes of relationships (e.g., identification versus friendships), 
and proximal and distant outcomes (e.g., trust, loyalty, or career and business success). 
There should be a base for establishing a guanxi. It is given in the case of family. Other 
factors such as common background may serve as a base for guanxi. Relational strength, 
content and modes differ contingent upon guanxi base. The model of guanxi as a system William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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proposed by Tsui & Farh (1997), and Tsui et al (2000) suggests complex interactions of 
bases for guanxi, relational and psychological features of guanxi and its social and 
instrumental outcomes. This conceptualization of guanxi has been linked to the theory of 
relational demography: demographic characteristics of network ties, e.g., age or gender, will 
have influences on network structures and relational aspects of ties such as tie strength, 
content and activation mode (Tsui & Farh, 1997, Farh, Tsui, Xin & Cheng, 1998). The 
notion that demographic characteristics of ties influence structural and relational dynamics 
of networks in important ways has been an aspect that is largely overlooked in social 
network theory. Incorporation of demographic, cultural, social, human capital and 
occupational (Lin, Fu, & Hsung, 2001) characteristics of network alters in guanxi analysis 
will enable us to identify and explain the way guanxi influences outcomes of purposeful 
actions such as venture investment. 
 Empirical  research  on  guanxi has produced largely confirmatory results of positive 
effects of social relations in the Chinese context on outcome variables. Guanxi capital (Bian, 
2001) promotes interpersonal trust at supervisor-subordinate relationship level (Farh, Tsui, 
Xin & Cheng, 1998), facilitates job mobility (Bian & Ang, 1997) and serves as hedging 
substitutes for institutional and legal deficiencies (Xin & Pearce, 1996). In the 
entrepreneurial context, embedded in Confucian values guanxi relationships indirectly 
decrease transaction costs of firms (Cheung & King, 2001), link overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurial clusters (Butler, Brown & Chamornmarn, 2000), enhance firm-level 
performance (Yeung & Tung, 1996), and contribute to wealth creation (Peng, 2001). There 
might be however possible negative effects of guanxi on outcome variables because of a 
strong sense of group and favoritism in guanxi relations (Tsui & Farh, 1997). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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  Qualitative research evidence suggests that guanxi does play a role in entrepreneurial 
and venture capital decision making in China (Liu, 1999). The hybrid institutional structures 
of Confucianism, Communism and Local capitalism emergent in China (Child & Boisot, 
1996, Nee, 1992, Oi, 1992) influences the way in which venture capitalists raise money for 
new funds and make investment decisions. A substantial portion of cash that goes into VC 
funds originates from government sources in China. Therefore, guanxi relationships of VC 
fund managers with government officials are often regarded as a defining factor for securing 
of government investments in VC funds. Given the increasing marketization of the Chinese 
economy however guanxi relationships will serve more and more as a risk mitigating device 
in VC investments rather than practices of nepotism and favoritism in decision making. 
HYPOTHESIS 
Prior Relationship and Referral 
Given the technical aspects of a venture project (technology, team and potential) 
have been assessed as strong, we predict that those entrepreneurs who have had prior social 
relationships with venture capitalists will be able to raise successfully private equity capital 
for their firms. Particularistic ties make a difference because investors possess tacit 
knowledge about behavioral history of entrepreneurs and engaging experience with them. 
This will enable them to make judgmental projections about entrepreneurs’ behavioral 
patterns such as predictability, honesty and trustworthiness. Empirical evidence suggest that 
investors scrutinize such personality qualities of entrepreneurs very carefully (Macmillan et 
al, 1985). Prior professional relationships verify networking skills and contact resources of 
entrepreneurs, which is a core advantage in the economy of guanxi wuan – webs of 
relationships (Lin, 2001c), in addition to routine due diligence check-ups on human capital. 
On the entrepreneur side, relationships will serve as filters to approach those investors who William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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are known for being patient and able to add value (Sapienza, 1992). Informal socializations 
such as social eating, an extremely important part of the Chinese culture (Bian, 2001, Yang, 
1994), will enable both investors and fund seekers to know values and beliefs of each other 
better, and facilitate interpersonal and cognitive trust in each other’s abilities and intentions. 
Cultural features of the Chinese such as a strong sense of social obligation, favoritism and 
inclinations to categorize people into “inner” and “outer” circles (Farh, et al., 1998) may 
also facilitate better communications of investors and entrepreneurs who know each other. 
Thus, dyadic ties defined as unordered pairs of actors and the arcs that exist between the two 
actors in the pair (Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 510) will enhance entrepreneurs’ access to 
venture capital. A previous research has found consistent evidence with this theorizing. 
Yeung & Tung (1996) found that Chinese entrepreneurs regard guanxi as one of many 
important factors, e.g., products or capability, for entrepreneurial success, and concluded 
that having guanxi is necessary but insufficient for long-term growth. Our own interviews 
with Chinese venture capitalists do confirm this logic and finding.  
A Shenzhen based venture capital firm - Guocheng Ventures invested in a high tech firm 
called Haidewei Biotechs in 1998. The lead general partner of Guocheng Ventures - Ma, 
knew Zhang, one of the founders of Haidewei Biotech before. They were friends for many 
years. Zhang told about his new venture to Ma in late 1997. Knowing that Zhang is a 
trustworthy, hardworking and able person, Ma introduced Zhang to his own VC partners 
with delight. After careful assessment of the technical indicators of the venture, Guocheng 
invested $535,000 in Haidewei. Two and a half years later, Guocheng exited successfully 
turning the original sum into $2.5 million - more than 4.5 times. 
 
   In high uncertainty situations such as new venture investment, prior relationships 
serve as a social risk reducing device, and therefore, it is likely to facilitate investment in-
flows given the universal criteria are met. We propose: 
Hypothesis 1: The entrepreneur is more likely to obtain an investment if the entrepreneur has 
a prior positive relationship with the venture capitalist given the technology/product, 
entrepreneurial team, growth potential of the venture and business plan are perceived as 
strong by the venture capitalist. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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  As a type of triadic ties, which are defined as unordered triples of actors and the arcs 
that exist between the three actors in the triad (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), third party 
referrals are expected to influence investment decisions of venture capitalists assuming the 
technical merits of a venture are perceived as strong by investors. A previous research found 
that network size of individual entrepreneurs is constrained by ceiling effects – the actual 
number of ties that could be managed by a person limits the absolute number of contacts in 
any personal networks (Batjargal, 2002). Therefore, direct ties have limited ranges of 
opportunities or “structural holes” (Burt, 1992). Consequently, entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists deliberately search out more and better opportunities through the practice of third 
party referral. Referrals lead to greater pools of actors (Fernandez, Castilla & Moore, 2000), 
which may be conducive to better venture projects and ideas. Trusted sources – referees 
serve as information filters about opportunities and trends, and this filtering may reduce 
search and identification costs at the screening stage (Burt, 1992). Finding a venture team or 
venture capitalist through third party referrals may facilitate matching between investors’ 
and entrepreneurs’ preferences and policies because sides do know each other’s preferences 
better. Also members of triads are likely to cooperate and comply with exchange rules in 
triads because of a strong normative power of triad members (Granovetter, 1985, 
Krackhardt, 1998). The Chinese context adds culture-specific variables that also affect 
investment selections through referrals. In the culture of shame, favor giver (the one who 
recommends someone to a third party) is regarded as a face giver, and favor receiver (the 
one who gets access to third party through the recommendation) is regarded as a face 
receiver (Lin, 2001c). Successful transactions between face giver (referee), face receiver 
(fund seeker), and investor will enhance face - mianzi (social standing, symbolic resources 
and reputation) of all parties (Lin, 2001c). Also face giver - referee would hesitate to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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recommend someone to a third person if he or she is not confident about successful 
outcomes because of fear of loosing face (shi  mianzi) of all parties involved  (Lin, 2001c). 
Although brokerage or bridging is wide-spread in China, it is important to note that the 
Chinese seem to have mixed feelings about this role: on the one hand, they admire or 
approve those who have powerful guanxi, and on the other hand, they are cautious of guanxi 
masters – neng ren who may take advantage of them.  
A qualitative evidence is consistent with the proposition that referrals affect venture 
finance decisions.  
A Tianjin based VC firm - New Era Ventures - invested in a company called Gwcom.com in 
1999. Lan, the CEO of New Era Ventures, admitted that the investors would have been 
much more cautious if he and Li, the referee for the founder of the firm (Wang) did not 
enjoy a long history of friendship. Lan, a successful venture capitalist in China, led the New 
Era Ventures from $US2.5 million fund to $US12.5 million fund in less than two years. Lan 
met Wang at a conference through a mutual friend - Li. Lan and Li had worked together 
before and have enduring friendship for more than a decade. Lan became interested in 
Wang’s project, a Chinese wireless palm computer, the main technological attraction of 
which was capability to read and write Chinese characters. It was an important innovation in 
China at that time. Because of the recommendation of Li, Lan did invest in Wang’s venture. 
 
Clearly, without the third party referral, outcomes of negotiations could have been 
different. Thus, third party referrals may improve chances of obtaining of venture capital 
because of opportunity filtering, information and trust benefits that mitigate social risks in 
decisions.  
Hypothesis 2: The entrepreneur is more likely to obtain an investment if the entrepreneur has 
been recommended to the venture capitalist by third parties whose judgment the venture 
capitalist trusts given the technology/product, entrepreneurial team, growth potential of the 
venture and business plan are perceived as strong by the venture capitalist. 
 
Strong Ties 
Once a venture was selected for investment, negotiations about components of the 
deal begin. This context is substantially different from the selection stage because all the 
venture projects have passed successfully the threshold of a promising venture. We predict William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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therefore that strong ties between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists do influence 
investment processes such as valuation, delivery and warrants due to the tangible and 
intangible benefits of relational strength.  
  We propose that tie strength will be associated with better valuations of the new 
venture. Friendly relations of investors and venture capitalists are likely to lead to fine-
tuned, honest and precise information exchanges between the venture team and VC firm. 
This may enable investors to do in-depth due diligence, and may increase confidence in the 
venture’s success. This projected success of the venture may incline investors towards better 
valuations of tangible and intangible assets of the firm. High-trust relationships may bias 
exchange partners in each other’s capabilities and resources, and these biases may influence 
positively valuation negotiations. Friendships may also reduce perceived risks of 
opportunistic behaviors such as machinations in investment flows, revenues and cash-flows 
on both sides. This lowered perception of opportunism may reflect positively on venture’s 
worthiness. Interpersonal liking and emotional idiosyncrasies between friends may also 
provide a broader room for value negotiations, which may be conducive to better valuations. 
Peculiarities of the Chinese negotiation behavior are likely to lead to increases in venture 
values. A sense of balance, modesty and mutuality is likely to smooth out negotiation 
processes where acceptable compromises are crafted out. For example, a Chinese 
entrepreneur said:  
When the Chinese people said it is a blessing to take less than you actually deserve, they did 
not say that you should always do so. The point is that you endeavor to take less, so that the 
other party will not let you to take less, then the whole enterprise will become prosperous. 
On the other hand, if you do not want to take less, the result will just be the opposite, 
because the other will try his best to make you take less (Cheung & King, 2001: 52). 
 
This mind-set of “give more and you will get more” may also result in higher values 
of ventures. Because guanxi is a public good where information diffusion is efficient and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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credible (Lin, 2001c) both investors and entrepreneurs may be pressurized not to be too 
persistent and aggressive, and this may influence negotiation postures of investors and 
managers. In this way, those entrepreneurs who have friendship ties with general partners of 
VC firms are assumed to get better values for their firms. The next proposition is: 
Hypothesis 3: The stronger the tie between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist, the 
higher the valuation of entrepreneurs’ firms. 
 
  A conventional logic suggests that friendly ties between fund providers and seekers 
will facilitate speedy negotiations and faster investment deliveries due to the perceived 
certainties in strong ties. In this sense, the stronger the tie the faster the investment delivery. 
Our prediction however is the opposite of this intuition. It is assumed that relational strength 
will be associated negatively with investment speed. In friend versus friend circumstances, 
there will be a plenty of information to digest on both sides, and it will slow down the 
decision making process. Because general partners and entrepreneurs are friends, there is a 
less probability on both sides to pool out of negotiations unpredictably and this will lighten 
up the time pressure on negotiators. An essential characteristic of guanxi is its long-term and 
sustainability orientation (Lin, 2001c). Strong ties are likely to be perceived as accessible 
and proximate by the Chinese. A sense of accessibility and proximity is likely to re-direct 
attention, time and resources of investors and managers to other competing activities. An 
empirical research on decision making processes in China found that the more the Chinese 
know about the opposite side the more likely to play a gentle game of forward and backward 
moves (Quanyu, Leonard & Tong, 1997). Field interviews support this statement. The lead 
general partner of the VC firm set up by the China Aerospace Science and Technology 
Corporation said in an interview:  
Well, to do business with your friends is more complicated than with strangers. You have to 
be very careful not to offend your pal. But you also have to think about business too. When 
you assess possibilities to invest in your friends’ venture there seems to be almost a sense of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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relief or relaxation. You do not feel a competitive pressure. You feel you know everything 
about him and his business. There is no a sense of urgency on both sides. And plus you have 
to follow all these Chinese rituals and routines with your friend. All these slow down the 
whole thing. I am in talks with my childhood friend. It is going on and on. But we will get 
there one day (Author’s interview, Beijing, July 2001). 
 
The underlying logic and findings let us to formulate the next proposal: 
Hypothesis 4: The stronger the tie between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist the longer 
the investment delivery period. 
 
  Our last hypothesis is on contractual provisions and warrants, which protect 
investors’ interests. It is proposed that those general partners who have strong guanxi ties 
with the entrepreneurs are less likely to legalize all the terms and conditions of investments 
in formal contracts. In the Chinese context, venture capitalists are likely to invest more in 
common stock rather than other senior securities such as convertible preferred stock, 
nonconvertible preferred stock, debt coupled with common stock, or common stock 
purchase warrants. Insisting on complicated securities that directly protect VC interests may 
send a signal of distrust and reduced commitment to the entrepreneurial team who have 
friendly relations with VC fund managers. Therefore, investors are likely to scale down 
attached terms and conditions, which in its turn cut down the number of formal provisions in 
contracts. The Chinese are said to be more situational. They would prefer to keep details of 
guanxi deals confidential (Lin, 2001c) and resolve potential issues and problems through 
tacit understandings and actions. Precise calculations of dividends, conversion, liquidation, 
and anti-dilution terms may reduce commitments of the entrepreneurial team and are likely 
to be perceived as unenforceable by investors and entrepreneurs. Investors also may view 
fewer warrants as another device to cultivate even deeper trust with their friends. This line 
of thought is supported by qualitative evidence. The lead fund manager of China Equity 
Investment said in an interview:  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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First, in China we do not know these warrants and financial devices you are talking about. 
Even if we know them they will be useless because our legal framework and financial 
system is insufficient to re-enforce them. The Chinese therefore will not believe in them. 
Second, if you keep saying I want this and I want that in negotiations with your friends, it 
will be perceived as though you are planting seeds of future conflicts, and people will regard 
you as selfish. If that is the case, a very few will be willing to do business with you. I think 
you will not find long lists of provisions in Chinese VC contracts” (Author’s interview, 
Beijing, June 2001). 
  
Therefore, we state: 
Hypothesis 5: The stronger the tie between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist the fewer 
the number of provisions and warrants, which protect venture capitalists’ interests. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
We created a list of 160 domestic venture capital firms in China using several data 
sources: the data-base of VCChina, the only consulting firm specialized in venture capital 
investments in China, internet sources (skyventure.com, chinatec.net, c-vcc.com), and 
interviews with academics and practitioners in VC industry in Beijing and Shanghai. We 
identified 43 VC firms in Beijing and 19 firms in Shanghai. This comprises 38 percent of all 
domestic VC firms in China. The only other city that has numerous VC firms is Shenzhen 
(24). In Beijing, we approached 30 firms selecting every second and third in the list and 22 
agreed to participate in the study (the response rate is 73 percent). In Shanghai, we contacted 
19 firms and 18 firms accepted our request to give interviews (the response rate is 94 
percent). In all, 23 CEOs and general partners were interviewed in Beijing and 19 CEOs and 
general partners were interviewed in Shanghai. 
  Prior systematic interviews, we conducted 7 semi-structured pilot interviews with 
CEOs and lead fund managers of VC firms in Beijing from November 2000 to April 2001. 
Interviews were conducted in English and Mandarin Chinese. Each interview lasted about William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
 
  21 
two hours and all the information were recorded, and used for design of the survey 
instrument. 
  The questionnaire was designed in English. The English version was translated into 
Chinese by a team of three scholars based at Renmin University’s School of Finance in 
Beijing. Two scholars of management at Peking University back translated the Chinese 
version into English. We compared two versions and eliminated any inconsistencies in 
wording and translations. In addition, we pre-tested our questionnaire with three fund 
managers and two entrepreneurs in Beijing in June 2001. Appropriate changes in question 
formulations and wording were made upon the completion of pre-testing. 
  The method of data collection was face-to-face interviews with CEOs and general 
partners. Two research officers at Peking University and a consultant at VCChina office in 
Shanghai conducted interviews in Mandarin Chinese under the close supervision of the 
authors. Each interview lasted about an hour. The questionnaire contained 8 questions on 
venture capitalist and 24 questions on venture investment decisions. We asked each general 
partner to select the last two positive investment decisions (VC firm decided to invest) in 
2000, and the last two negative investment decisions (VC firm decided not to invest) in 
2000. Thus we collected information on four investment decisions maximum from each 
respondent. In this way, investments were selected randomly within two groups. In total, we 
collected information on 76 positive investment decisions and 82 negative decisions. 
Variables and Measurements 
Focal Independent Variables and Measurements 
  Independent variable is social capital of the entrepreneur. Social capital is measured 
by prior relationship scale, third party-referral scale and strong ties (Shane & Cable, 2001). 
The social capital measurements were multi-item, evenly weighted scales. Distribution William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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values of each question were five-point Likert scale items ranging from strongly agree (5) to 
strongly disagree (1). We computed each scale by adding up the values in each item and 
dividing them by the number of items. We adapted the items from Shane and Cable (2001) 
although we had to re-formulate them for investors rather than entrepreneurs themselves.  
The prior relationship scale between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist was 
comprised of three questions (Cronbach alpha is 0.78). These questions were: “As a venture 
capitalist, I had a professional relationship with the entrepreneur prior seeing the business 
plan”; “As a venture capitalist, I had engaged in informal social activities, e.g., dinners and 
other social activities, with the entrepreneur prior seeing the business plan”; “The 
entrepreneur was a personal friend prior seeing the business plan”.  
The referral scale was measured by four items (Cronbach alpha is 0.72): “Someone 
whom I trust to discuss important confidential matters knew the entrepreneur”; “A third 
party whose judgement I trust provided me with non-public information about the 
entrepreneur”; “I could obtain information about the entrepreneur from my network of 
contacts faster than other investors could obtain the same information”; “By calling people I 
know, I could obtain information about the entrepreneur in a relatively inexpensive 
manner”.  
Strong ties was measured by a friendship item: “The entrepreneur was a personal friend 
prior seeing the business plan”.  
Dependent Variables and Measurements 
Dependent variables were investment selection decision, venture valuation, speed of 
investment delivery, and contractual warrants and provisions. 
Investment selection is a binary variable of one if the venture received the 
investment and zero if the venture did not receive the investment.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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Venture valuation was measured by the difference in percentages of the initial 
valuation of the firm by the investor and the final valuation of the firm by the investor. We 
asked two questions about the initial valuation: “What was the initial size of investment 
(RMB – the Chinese currency) you offered to the venture team”; “What was the initial 
equity you sought in the venture (in percentage)”. All data in RMB were deflated by the 
2000 year’s average of exchange rate of RMB and $US published in The Economist. From 
this data we calculated the value of the venture initially put forward by the venture capitalist 
(London Business School, 1997). We asked two questions about the final valuation: “What 
was the final investment amount (in RMB) you decided to invest in the venture”: “What was 
the percentage of equity your VC firm has received for the investment”. From this 
information we calculated the final value of the venture accepted by the venture capitalist 
and the entrepreneurial team. The difference between the initial value and the final value 
was calculated, and it was expressed in percentage in relation to the initial value. This 
number is venture valuation measurement. 
Speed of investment delivery was measured by the number of months from the date 
of positive investment selection decision to the date of first injection of the investment into 
the venture. We asked the date of investment selection decision and the date of first 
installment, and from these we calculated number of months. 
Contractual provisions/warrants was measured by the number of provisions/warrants 
in contracts, which protect the VC interests. We asked a question: “How many provisions 
and warrants, which protect your firm’s interests, were formalized in the final contract”. 
Control Variables and Measurements 
  Control variables were region, industry, initial investment sought by the 
entrepreneur, investment stage, experience of general partners in VC fund management, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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number of investments under management, number of business plans received in 2000, age 
of VC firm, size of VC firm. We control for these factors because researchers found that 
these variables do influence access of entrepreneurs to private equity (Bygrave et al., 1998, 
Hall & Hofer, 1993, Macmillan, Siegel, & Subba Narasimha, 1985, Macmillan, Zeman & 
Subba Narasimha, 1987, Timmons, 1994). Some of the controls were included because our 
field interviews indicated that these variables affect venture finance decisions of investors. 
  The regions are Beijing, the China’s capital city, and Shanghai, the business center 
of China. Industries include Internet/IT, biotechnology, service, manufacturing, telecom, and 
engineering/new materials. The initial investment amount sought by the entrepreneur is 
expressed in $US. Investment stage was measured by pre-revenue stage and pre-profit stage. 
Pre-revenue is a binary variable of one if the new venture has had no revenues by the time 
they approached the VC firm and zero if the venture has had revenues by the time they 
approached the VC firm. Pre-profit is a binary variable of one if the venture has made no 
profit prior venture investment, and zero if the venture has made profit prior investment. 
Experience of general partners in VC fund management was measured in years of working 
as a venture capital partner. Investment under management was measured by the number of 
venture deals under the direct management of the venture capitalist. The number of business 
plans received in 2000 was captured by the question “Approximately, how many business 
plans have you received from entrepreneurs in 2000?’. Age of VC firms was measured in 
years of operation as a VC firm. The number of full time employees captured size of VC 
firm. 
 Moderator Variables and Measurements 
Technology/products, quality of the entrepreneurial team, growth potential of the 
venture, and perceived quality of the business plan are moderator variables. The William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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measurements for technology/products, entrepreneurial team, growth potential of the 
venture, and quality of business plan were multi-item, evenly weighted scales. 
Technology/product scale and business plan scale items were adapted from Shane & Cable 
(2001). Technology/products scale is composed of two items (Cronbach alpha is 0.72): “The 
technology employed or products offered by the venture would provide a significant 
competitive advantage”; “The venture’s technology had a strong proprietary position”.  
Business plan scale is comprised of two items (Cronbach alpha is 0.76): “The business plan 
was thorough in its coverage of key issues”; “The business plan did an excellent job of 
articulating the opportunity”. Growth potential scale is measured by two items (Cronbach 
alpha is 0.71): “The venture is a potentially high growth firm”; “The venture’s competitive 
strategy is superior than its competitors”. Team scale is composed of two items (Cronbach 
alpha is 0.76): “At least one member of the venture team had previous startup experience”; 
“At least one member of the venture team had experience in the relevant industry”. 
Construct Validity 
  In addition to Cronbach’s alpha, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the 
measurement model associated with Likert scale items to assess how well our interview 
questions load onto the constructs. Results indicate that fit of our model and the data is 
reasonable. We found that the comparative fit index is 0.89, the incremental fit index is 0.91, 
and the root mean squared error of approximation is 0.078. These indicators are regarded as 
acceptable by researchers. In addition, we carried out a factor analysis that focused only on 
independent variables: fit indexes were above 0.85 and the factor loading was acceptable 
(the average on-factor loading was 0.63). The findings suggest that our data are valid 
internally. Shane & Cable (2001) did the same analysis for the same question items and 
found even better results. Their findings re-enforce the external validity of our constructs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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  Since our questions on prior relationships are perceptual items, we did validate these 
data by calling up 12 randomly chosen entrepreneurs in Beijing. We asked 3 questions on 
prior relationships and compared the answers with the venture capitalists’ perceptions of 
their relationships. They were fully consistent with the information we collected from the 
general partners. This also strengthens the external validity of our measurements. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations between variables. 
Means for prior relationships and referrals are consistent with the logic that most people will 
have more indirect ties (referrals) than direct relationships. Four moderator scales 
(technology, growth potential, team and business plan) are above three, and this may 
indicate that self-selection process is at work. Only those entrepreneurs who think their 
products and plans have chances to be funded do approach VC firms. Team scale is the 
highest, and this is consistent with findings in the West that people who have industry 
knowledge and experience tend to start businesses in relevant industries. A surprising 
finding was that firms in Internet/IT business comprise more than 50 percent of the sample 
given the recent defaults of many Internet firms in the West. This may indicate a different 
cycle of the Chinese economy as well as the adolescent nature of Internet industry in China. 
An expected result was that two-thirds of firms that seek venture capital were in the growth 
stage. Also the mean for initial amount sought is high ($1.7 million) by developing country 
standards. The other findings are more or less consistent with our expectations.                            
 
Investment Selection 
  Table 4 demonstrates the results of logistic regression analysis predicting the 
investment selection as a function of interactions of social capital with other investment William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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determining factors. We are aware that our sampling method of venture decisions is 
retrospective. This retrospective feature does not influence differences on the logistic scale 
although it affects intercepts (McCullagh & Nelder, 1999). The model 1 is the base model, 
which includes all control and moderator variables. Shanghai and other high tech dummies 
are the reference groups. The model shows that technology/products, entrepreneurial team, 
and growth potential of venture are associated positively and significantly with investment 
selection. The model is significant (chi-square is 148.29, p<0.001). The model 2 
demonstrates impacts of focal independent variables (prior relations and referrals) on 
investment selection decisions. It illustrates that none of two social capital variables have 
main effects on the probability of venture investment selections. The model is significant  
(chi-square is 150.92, p<0.001).  
Models 3-6 present effects of prior relationship and its interactions with four 
moderator variables (technology, team, growth potential and business plan quality) on 
investment selection (Jaccard, 2001). These models demonstrate findings on hypothesis 1. 
Model 3 indicates that interaction effects of prior relations and technology are not significant 
although causal direction is positive. The model is significant (chi-square is 150.95, 
p<0.001). Model 4 shows that interactions of prior relations and team are not significant 
although the causal direction is positive. The model is significant (chi-square is 151.06, 
p<0.001). Models 5 and 6 demonstrate that interaction effects of prior relations and growth 
potential, and interactions of prior relations and quality of business plan are positive and 
significant. Both models are significant (chi-square is 157.71, p<0.001, chi-square is 155.26, 
p<0.001 accordingly). In models 5-6, we find a partial support for hypothesis 1. 
Models 7-10 present results on how interactions of third party referral with 
moderators are related to investment selection. In Model 7, we see that interactions of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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referral and technology have positive and significant impacts on likelihood of investment 
selection. The model is significant (chi-square is 150.98, p<0.001). Model 8 reveals that 
interactions of referral and entrepreneurial team are positively and significantly associated 
with probability of being selected for investment. The model is significant (chi-square is 
151.16, p<0.001). Model 9 indicates that interactions of referral and growth potential 
influence positively chances of obtaining private equity. The model is also significant (chi-
square is 156.59, p<0.001). Model 10 indicates that interactions of referral and business plan 
quality are not correlated with investment likelihood. Moreover, the causal direction is 
negative. The model is significant (chi-square is 155.68, p<0.001).  
Thus, findings in models 7-9 do support hypothesis 2 that those entrepreneurs who 
have been recommended to the investor by a trusted source are likely to secure venture 
finance. 
 
Valuation, Investment Speed and Warrants 
  We present our findings on how strong ties impact investment processes such as 
valuation, delivery speed and warrants in Table 5. Regression analysis illustrates that strong 
ties predict venture valuation, investment delivery speed and warrants. In addition, findings 
suggest significant effects of region (Beijing dummy) and experience on outcome variables. 
  Model 1 is the base model for venture valuation. Although the model is not 
significant (F = 1.26), Beijing dummy is associated positively with better venture valuation. 
Model 2 reveals positive effects of strong ties on venture valuation changes. Experience of 
venture capitalist also predicts better valuations. The overall model is significant (F = 5.78, 
p<0.001). Model 3 is the base model for investment delivery speed and it is not significant 
(F = 1.43). In model 4, we see positive and significant effects of strong ties on investment William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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delivery speed although the overall model is not significant. The stronger the tie the slower 
the investment installment. Model 5 is the base model for warrants and it reveals that region  
- Beijing dummy has positive effects on contractual provisions and warrants although the 
overall model (F = 1.71) is not significant. In model 6, we found significant negative effects 
of tie strength on contractual warrants. The stronger the relationship the fewer the 
provisions, which protect investors’ interests, in written contracts. The model is significant 
(F = 1.78, p<0.05). Thus, hypotheses 3 on venture valuation, hypothesis 4 on investment 
delivery speed, and hypothesis 5 on warrants/provisions have been confirmed by the 
findings. Tie strength influences significantly processes of investment decisions. 
 
DISCUSSION 
  Hypothesis One that direct ties of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are likely to 
enhance entrepreneurs’ access to venture capital in interaction with universal decision 
criteria such as technology, team, growth potential and quality of business plan has been 
confirmed partially. Consequently, we state that particularistic ties of VCs and entrepreneurs 
are supplementary to primary investment decision factors due to the risk mitigating role of 
direct contacts in high uncertainty situations. Direct ties do mitigate risks through 
judgmental projections about venture’s success and behavioral patterns of entrepreneurs 
based on relational history, ascertaining network and positional resources of entrepreneurs, 
and identifying accurately personal qualities of entrepreneurs such as attitudes, values, 
mental stamina and drive to succeed. A cultural inclination of the Chinese to favor those 
whom know also contributes to risk mitigating role of prior professional and personal 
relationships in venture financing in the Chinese context. 
 Hypothesis  Two that indirect ties (third party referrals) are likely to influence 
investment selection decisions of venture capitalists in interaction with universal decision William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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making criteria of technology, management team, growth perspective and perceived quality 
of business plan is affirmative. Social referral reduces uncertainties surrounding new venture 
finance in a number of ways. The venture capitalist “disperses” some of the risks to the 
referee (the one who recommends) so that in case future transactions and relationships are 
unsuccessful he can protect his own reputation and social standing among the 
entrepreneurial and the venture capital community by blaming the referee. Through third 
parties, investors filter and screen projects and teams from larger pools. It increases chances 
to find better projects in technical terms, and able and less opportunistic management teams. 
On the referee side, he/she is likely to recommend only those who have promising projects 
and those who proved themselves as reliable and trustworthy exchange partners. This 
selection will have two opposite implications contingent upon the outcome: if the 
transaction is successful it will enhance the referee’s own social standing and influence, and 
if it is not successful it will harm his reputation and standing within the entrepreneurial and 
VC community. Therefore, the referee will be selective, and this directly mitigates the 
venture capitalist’s social risk. Such social calculations are especially widespread in the 
culture of guanxi where results of transactions become immediately public through efficient 
information diffusion channels among members of particular guanxi clusters (Lin, 2001c). 
Third party referrals may lead to better matching not only in terms of investment preferences 
such as industry or market niche, but also in terms of social matching: the right personal 
chemistry between the investor and the entrepreneurial team is likely to mitigate risks of 
future conflicts and reduce costs. There will be strong mutual pressures and expectations 
among the triad members in this context (Krackhardt, 1998). This influences indirectly 
investment selections.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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Hypothesis Three anticipated that those entrepreneurs who have friendly 
relationships with equity investors are more likely to get better valuations of their firms. The 
results are consistent with this assumption. Two controls appeared significant in the 
regressions. Beijing based VC firms are more likely to increase the initial value of firms. A 
possible explanation is that these funds are likely to have more government money and thus 
be cash rich because of their proximity to the central government, major R&D institutes and 
universities, and government sponsored high tech zones such as Zhong Guan Cun in north 
Beijing. This soft budget constraint (Kornai, 1992) may be reflected in better values of 
friendly firms. Experienced fund managers are more likely to appreciate venture values. 
This is plausible for two reasons. Experienced investors may deliberately put lower values at 
the beginning so that we would have a larger room for concessions in the future. Making 
concessions in venture values may send a signal of commitment to the entrepreneurial team 
and this may enhance competitive advantage of investors in getting best projects. Because of 
their accumulated knowledge and experience, “veteran” investors are more likely to pick up 
better projects at the screening stage, and this increases the likelihood of appreciation in 
venture values. 
Relational strength does matter in venture valuations. Intense information exchange 
between friends promotes confidence in entrepreneurial success on both sides, fund provider 
and seeker. Confident venture capitalists are more likely to put higher numbers on new firms 
(Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001). Friendship “myopia” or biases are likely to overlook 
potential downsides, and this affects valuations in favor of the entrepreneurial team. Strong 
ties lead to tacit understandings and expectations of investors on involvement in crucial 
financial and strategic decisions as an exchange pay-back for better values. The human 
equation- liking and emotional attachment is likely to be a factor in the culture of ren qing. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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A Confucian exchange tactic of giving more in expectation of getting more is at work: by 
valuing firms higher investors do accumulate “social receivables”, and these monetary 
favors in advance are used as an influence leverage over entrepreneurs. This could be a 
crucial risk mitigating technique especially in bad times. Exchange favors without binding 
agreements are likely to promote further trust in investor-entrepreneur relationships (Molm, 
Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). 
Although not robust, the evidence on Hypothesis Four supports tentatively our 
statement: friendly relations have reverse effects on investment delivery speed. “Excessive” 
information flows in both directions makes decision-making less efficient. A sense of 
accessibility, proximity and certainty leads to “complacency” of investors and entrepreneurs, 
and re-directs attention and time to other competing activities. In the Chinese mind, forward 
and backward actions in exchange processes are as important as outcomes. The Chinese 
therefore are more inclined to play “the Chinese chess” with their friends. 
Stronger relationships lead to fewer contractual warrants that protect directly the 
investor’s interests (Hypothesis Five). Investment contracts of friendly investors and 
entrepreneurs do contain fewer terms due to the strong trust between friends. Venture 
capitalists do not formalize many terms in warrants because of its positive perceptual and 
signaling effects on the entrepreneurial team. Less formalization indicates the commitment 
to share risks with the management team, and this in its turn deepens trust between the sides. 
In friendly circumstances, investors seem prefer fewer, clearly defined provisions in contrast 
to numerous and vaguely defined terms, which may jeopardize their personal friendship with 
the entrepreneur. In addition, the Chinese are more likely to rely on guanxi mechanisms and 
channels to protect their interests than contractual warrants that may be impossible to re-
enforce given the legal and institutional deficiencies. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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In high uncertainty and instrumentality context such as new venture finance, actors 
are likely to structure and categorize risks to maximize utility. Investors are likely to employ 
universal and industry wide criteria to mitigate risks that minimize utility outcomes directly. 
In the venture capitalist context, risks that minimize utility benefits directly are 
technology/products risks, management team risks, and growth perspective risk. Therefore, 
investors as rational players make decisions based on universal criteria. However, venture 
capitalists are likely to employ particularistic criteria such as social relationships in dealing 
with social uncertainties that may or may not decrease utility outcomes directly. Thus, social 
capital of entrepreneurs has enhancing effects on investment selection and main effects on 
investment processes. 
LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Several limitations of this study should be discussed. This is a retrospective study 
about past investment decisions, and therefore, there might be an issue of to what extent 
respondents recall accurately information on past investment decisions. We used social 
capital measurements that were developed in the Western context for measuring an 
indigenous social phenomenon deeply rooted in Eastern and Confucius cultures – guanxi. 
We think therefore that there might be important features of guanxi that our measurements 
simply did not capture. The venture capital industry in the People’s Republic of China is 
young. This macro institutional condition may have affected our results although we assume 
all the respondents have been exposed to the same conditions to the same extent. For 
example, many forms of warrants are unknown in China although we found enough 
variations in our variable on contractual provisions. 
An important theoretical implication is that why and how, and in what contexts other 
than new venture finance social capital does have supplementary or enhancing effects on William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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outcome variables should be further elaborated. Another equally important implication is 
that we should design and employ more indigenous systematic measurements that capture 
unique features of social relationships in different cultural and societal contexts. This will 
enrich our knowledge on methodologies of social network research. Interesting aspects of 
future research on guanxi are negative effects of positive guanxi and positive effects of 
negative guanxi. For example, to what extent favoritism in relationships or high network 
closure in clique-type clusters do affect outcome variables negatively? To what extend, 
perceived negative relationships do have positive effects on outcome variables? 
An implication for entrepreneurship research is to examine impacts of the way in 
which venture capital was raised on firm performance. For example, whether firms which 
raised private equity through personal relationships do better than those firms which did not 
raise venture capital through personal ties. An interesting issue may be how and when super-
strong ties or over-embeddedness does affect negatively entrepreneurial performance. 
Finally, dynamics of guanxi, i.e., changes in network structures and relations over 
time, is an interesting theme given the social and economic changes that are taking place in 
China. 
CONCLUSION 
The main finding of this study is that in high uncertainty and high utility maximizing 
context such as new venture finance, social capital has enhancing effects on investment 
selection as opposed to main effects in the screening stage due to the risk mitigating role. 
Once the venture passes the threshold of being funded, strong ties are at work independent 
of other factors.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 453 
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TABLE 1. Venture Capital Firms in China 
 
 N  Investment   
Policy 
Location Funds  under 
management 
($US) 
VC firms financed by 
governments 
60 All  industries  Provincial 
centers 
>25 million 
VC firms financed by 
private individuals 
30  Hi-tech focus  Major cities  ≤12.5 million 
Foreign VC firms  60  Information 
technology 
focus 
Beijing 
Shanghai 
Shenzhen 
40-60 
million* 
VC firms financed by 
public companies 
20  Hi-tech focus  Major cities  1-6 million 
VC firms financed by 
financial institutions 
10  All industries  Capital cities   
         Source: VCChina, and Renmin University VC Research Center, July 2001    
         *Funds dedicated to China market only 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.  General Partners of VC Firms 
 
  N Mean  Std.  D. 
Beijing dummy  42  0.55  0.50 
Shanghai dummy  42  0.45  0.50 
Male dummy  42  0.92  0.26 
BA education dummy  42  0.21  0.41 
Master’s education dummy  42  0.64  0.48 
Doctoral education dummy  42  0.14  0.35 
Age of general partner  40  35  5.78 
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